Does a Severely Injured Plaintiff Have a Right to Be in the Courtroom?
Defendants in cases involving severe injuries including brain injury, spinal cord, or burn injury, often request that the injured plaintiff is not present in the courtroom during the trial. The defense’s argument is that the plaintiff cannot contribute to the proceedings in any meaningful way due to the extent of the injuries.
Thus, the defense argues that the plaintiff’s presence only serves to gain sympathy from the jury and effectively bias the jury against the defendant before it has even heard the facts of the case.
In Kesterson v. Jarrett, S11G0590 (Ga. S. Ct. June 18, 2012), a medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled on whether a severely injured plaintiff has a right to be in the courtroom during the prosecution of their case. At the trial court level, the judge excluded the minor plaintiff, a young child with severe cerebral palsy, from the courtroom during the liability phase of a bifurcated trial.
Plaintiff’s counsel argued that they did not expect the plaintiff to be present for lengthy durations during any phase of the bifurcated trial. However, plaintiffs argued that the plaintiff had a constitutional right to be present to some extent at her trial.
The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed with the plaintiffs, affirming the trial court. The court ruled that the trial judge has a right to exclude a plaintiff from a courtroom when the plaintiff cannot meaningfully participate in a trial due to a debilitating injury, and the plaintiff’s condition would only serve to gain sympathy from the jury.
The plaintiff’s plea to attend the trial ultimately succeeded when the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the lower court, ruling that she did have a right to attend her own trial.
The court wrote, “A party may not be excluded from her own trial simply because her physical and mental condition may evoke sympathy, even under these circumstances. Instead, trial courts can and should address the risk of undue sympathy using jury instructions and other common and time-tested means of ensuring that both parties receive a fair trial, without infringing on the parties’ right to be present.
The court’s decision noted that several other jurisdictions rule the same way on this issue.
AUTHOR: Davis Levin Livingston
Copyright Davis Levin Livingston - Google+
More information about Davis Levin Livingston
Disclaimer: While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of this publication, it is not intended to provide legal advice as individual situations will differ and should be discussed with an expert and/or lawyer. For specific technical or legal advice on the information provided and related topics, please contact the author.
In Kesterson v. Jarrett, S11G0590 (Ga. S. Ct. June 18, 2012), a medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled on whether a severely injured plaintiff has a right to be in the courtroom during the prosecution of their case. At the trial court level, the judge excluded the minor plaintiff, a young child with severe cerebral palsy, from the courtroom during the liability phase of a bifurcated trial.
Plaintiff’s counsel argued that they did not expect the plaintiff to be present for lengthy durations during any phase of the bifurcated trial. However, plaintiffs argued that the plaintiff had a constitutional right to be present to some extent at her trial.
The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed with the plaintiffs, affirming the trial court. The court ruled that the trial judge has a right to exclude a plaintiff from a courtroom when the plaintiff cannot meaningfully participate in a trial due to a debilitating injury, and the plaintiff’s condition would only serve to gain sympathy from the jury.
The plaintiff’s plea to attend the trial ultimately succeeded when the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the lower court, ruling that she did have a right to attend her own trial.
The court wrote, “A party may not be excluded from her own trial simply because her physical and mental condition may evoke sympathy, even under these circumstances. Instead, trial courts can and should address the risk of undue sympathy using jury instructions and other common and time-tested means of ensuring that both parties receive a fair trial, without infringing on the parties’ right to be present.
The court’s decision noted that several other jurisdictions rule the same way on this issue.
AUTHOR: Davis Levin Livingston
Copyright Davis Levin Livingston - Google+
More information about Davis Levin Livingston
View all articles published by Davis Levin Livingston
Disclaimer: While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of this publication, it is not intended to provide legal advice as individual situations will differ and should be discussed with an expert and/or lawyer. For specific technical or legal advice on the information provided and related topics, please contact the author.

Call the Attorney at (877) 764-8595
Free Consultation
